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20 February 1981


MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Data Processing

VIA: Inspector General *EB*FROM:
Chief, Audit StaffSUBJECT: Report of Audit, Office of Data Processing,
For the Period 1 July 1978 - 30 September 1980

1. Attached is the subject report for your information.

2. This report summarizes the background, scope and results of the Audit Staff's independent audit of the Office of Data Processing. Please advise me of action taken on the recommendations contained in the report.

3. We wish to express our appreciation for the cooperation and assistance provided by members of your office during the audit.

Attachment:
As stated

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SECRETREPORT OF AUDIT
Office of Data ProcessingFor the Period
1 July 1978 - 30 September 1980SUMMARY

1. Financial controls, procedures and records of the Office of Data Processing (ODP) were in accordance with Agency regulations. Prior audit recommendations, with the exception of one that pertains to disaster recovery, were satisfactorily resolved. Minor administrative matters, including the need to better monitor prior fiscal year unliquidated obligations, were discussed with responsible officials and resolved during the audit. This report includes comments and recommendations concerning the following:

- a. formalizing the position of the Operations Security Officer;
- b. completing a written disaster recovery plan for the two computer centers;
- c. improving fire safety in the Special Center; and
- d. implementing technical data security controls.

SCOPE

2. The audit included a review of administrative functions to evaluate the effectiveness of controls and procedures and to assure compliance with Agency regulations. Financial and logistical transactions were tested to determine that documentation, approvals and certifications were in accordance with applicable accounting and reporting requirements and to ensure that expenditures were within the scope of authorized activities.

3. The audit also included reviews and tests within both computer centers to determine that established procedures and other documentation were sufficient, adequate and followed to protect against potential security and safety risks. A survey of ODP/Applications was performed to identify the standards and procedures utilized for application systems development. Because the ODP is still in the process of revising its applications development standards, no tests were conducted to determine use or compliance with those standards.

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BACKGROUND

4. ODP provides a central computer service to satisfy automatic data processing (ADP) requests from Agency components and to satisfy Intelligence Community requirements as assigned. In performing this service ODP had as of 30 September 1980 a personnel ceiling

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- a. review and coordinate Agency proposals for the acquisition of computer hardware (including word processing equipment), software, and services;
- b. operate two computer centers (Ruffing and Special) to provide facilities and services for batch and interactive computer processing, data base management, and on-line information storage and retrieval; and
- c. perform analysis of requirements for ADP services, develop and implement application systems, and perform maintenance and production control of completed application programs.

5. The ODP's operating budget for Fiscal Year 1980 is summarized as follows:

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SECRETDETAILED COMMENTSOperations Security Officer

7. During the audit several potential security weaknesses and safety hazards were observed in the two computer centers (primarily in the Ruffing Center). When these problems were brought to the attention of the ODP/Operations Security Officer, they were promptly corrected. The position of Operations Security Officer was established by ODP on a temporary basis to develop and implement a security awareness program for the two computer centers. By ODP's account the security awareness program is successful. The continuous enforcement of security and safety practices is of vital importance to the Agency. The ODP should therefore formalize the position of Operations Security Officer by making it a permanent position, by writing a job description, and by giving the incumbent clear lines of authority.

Recommendation #1: Formally designate a position as Operations Security Officer, establish written responsibilities for the position, and have the incumbent report to the Deputy Director ODP/Processing to ensure adequate authority to administer an effective operations security program.

Disaster Recovery Plan

8. The prior report of audit discussed the need for a disaster recovery plan to minimize the magnitude of service interruption in an emergency situation. ODP informed the Audit Staff that it would develop a methodology for determining the Agency's emergency ADP requirements; prepare and cost out a plan; and with higher management approval undertake the necessary preparation to execute the plan. The ODP has developed a disaster plan that relies on moving critical applications to a surviving center. ODP has not, however, identified or prioritized the critical applications; planned for the move; nor tested the compatibility of either computer center with the other's data. Until these steps are completed the current disaster plan cannot be considered sufficient for actual use in an emergency.

Recommendation #2: Identify and prioritize the Agency's emergency ADP requirements and develop written operating procedures to ensure a successful exchange of applications between the two computer centers. Also provide for periodic updates and tests of the plan after development.

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Fire Safety

9. Improvements in fire safety are needed in the Special Center. The Special Center is so filled with computer hardware and data storage material that in case of fire it is questionable whether employees could make a safe and orderly exit from the center. Safe exit from the tape library is particularly doubtful. The ODP is aware of the problem, and has requested an architectural study to provide sufficient and adequate emergency exits. Until that study is completed ODP should continue to seek to identify and implement interim means of improving fire safety within the Special Center.

Recommendation #3: Continue efforts to improve fire safety within the Special Center.

Data Security Controls

10. For many years the ODP has recognized that technical security controls to protect sensitive data were inadequate. In lieu of sufficient technical controls manual procedures were applied. Improved technical security control systems have recently become available. The ODP currently is installing one such system, called Access Control Facility - 2 (ACF-2). The ACF-2 requires a prolonged and carefully coordinated period of implementation. Once fully implemented, ACF-2 should significantly improve the security of sensitive computerized data. No additional recommendation is thus considered necessary.

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ODP 81-203

17 FEB 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Audit Staff

FROM: Bruce T. Johnson
Director of Data Processing

SUBJECT: Report of Audit of Office of Data
Processing as of 30 September 1980

Attached are ODP responses to the recommendations contained in the subject report. For convenience we have repeated each recommendation beside each ODP response.

[Redacted Signature Box]

Bruce T. Johnson

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Att: a/s

Report of Audit of Office of Data Processing
as of 30 September 1980

ODP has reviewed the 3 recommendations that are contained in your Audit Report with the following comments:

Audit Staff Recommendation

ODP Response

#1: Formally designate a position as Operations Security Officer and have the incumbent report to the Deputy Director ODP/Processing to ensure adequate authority to administer an operations security program.

We concur in your suggestion that a position of Security Officer in Operations Division be formally established. In your explanation of the issues, however, you stated that "numerous potential security weaknesses and safety hazards were observed in the computer centers (primarily in the Ruffing Center)." It is my understanding that you made 3 suggestions dealing with the receptionist areas in the Ruffing Center that were quickly implemented. That hardly seems like "numerous potential security weaknesses." Concerning your statement about the chain of command, I have designated that this incumbent should report to the Chief, Operations Division. I have been assured by the Deputy Director for Processing that he will receive periodic reports on the activities of this Security Officer.

#2: Identify and prioritize the Agency's emergency ADP requirements and develop written operating procedures to ensure a successful exchange of applications between the two computer centers. Also provide for periodic updates and tests of the plan after development.

Concur. ODP will insure that the major applications running in each computer center can be executed in the other. This process has already started with running a large batch Ruffing Center job in the Special Center. In addition, two planning documents will be written (1) Definition of Responsibility In Case of Disaster and (2) Restoration Plan. The first document deals with keeping ODP running with its limited resources and the second specifies the steps necessary to restore the service that was destroyed.

Audit Staff Recommendation

ODP Response

#3: Continue efforts to improve
fire safety within the Special
center.

Concur.

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A final editing note, the Background Section specified that ODP has a

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